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Are there different moral domains? Evidence fromMongolia
Q1 Renatas Berniūnas,1* Vilius Dranseika1 and Paulo Sousa2
1Vilnius University, Lithuania and 2Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland
In this paper we report a study conducted in Mongolia on the scope of morality, that is, the extent to which people
moralize different social domains. Following Turiel’s moral-conventional task, we characterized moral
transgressions (in contrast to conventional transgressions) in terms of two dimensions: authority independence
and generality of scope. Differentmoral domains are then defined by grouping such moral transgressions in terms
of their content (following Haidt’s classification of morally relevant domains). There are four main results of the
study. First, since all five Haidtian domains were moralized by the Mongolian participants, the study provides
evidence in favour of pluralism about moral domains. However, the study also suggests that the domain of harm
can be reduced to the fairness domain. Furthermore, although the strong claim about reduction of all moral domains
to the domain of fairness seems not to hold, a significant number of participants did indicate considerations of
fairness across domains. Finally, a significant amount of participants moralized conventional transgressions a la
Turiel, but it did not reach a statistical significance.
Key words: Mongolia, social cognition, moral domains, moral psychology, moral/conventional task.
In a recent review,Q2 Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan (2010)
argued that there is an obvious lack of cross-cultural
perspective in studying human cognition, with researchers
far too often relying on the so-called WEIRD (Western,
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) sample to
draw wide generalizations about cognitive universals.
Similarly, there is an obvious lack of cross-cultural
perspective in studying moral cognition (see also Sachdeva,
Singh, & Medin, 2011), although with some notable
exceptions.1 Thus, heeding ecological validity, theoretical
claims should be tested with a culturally more diverse
sample. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to address debates
about the scope of morality in the light of new evidence from
Mongolia – an underrepresented cultural context.
Currently, there are several conflicting positions on the scope
of morality, ranging from complete pluralists to complete
monists. On the pluralist side, Haidt and his colleagues,
following Shweder (e.g., Shweder et al., 1997), argued that
there are at least five moral domains, comprising transgressions
related to concerns about care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/
betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation
(Haidt & Graham, 2007; for a recent theoretical review
see Graham et al., 2013; for a recent methodological review
see Graham et al., 2011; see also Sinnott-Armstrong &
Wheatley, 2012). The moral foundations theory (MFT),
advocated by Haidt and his colleagues, argues that five
types of concerns are salient across different cultures and
different socio-economic groups, except to people from
WEIRD societies, who mainly emphasize harm and fairness
(see, e.g., Haidt et al., 1993). For example, Haidt and Graham
(2007) demonstrate that American liberals mainly focus on
harm and fairness, while American conservatives focus on
all five transgressions. This pluralistic position was presented
as an explicit criticism of Turiel and colleagues, who have
argued that harm and fairness transgressions constitute two
basic moral domains in human moral cognition (Nucci,
2001; Smetana, 1993; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, 1983). Thus,
following Haidt’s research, Mongolian participants, who
are from a more traditionalistic no-WEIRD society, should
be concerned with five types of moral transgressions, not
only with harm and fairness (as Turiel argued).
However, two versions of moral monism recently
emerged, which countered Haidt’s pluralism by suggesting
refined theoretical frameworks to account for the multitude
of moral concerns. For instance, Gray and colleagues have
argued that actually harmful transgressions constitute the
basic moral domain, implying a completely monistic view
of morality (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). They propose
that ‘morality is essentially represented by a cognitive
template that combines a perceived intentional agent with a
perceived suffering patient’ (p. 102), and this moral dyadic
template (intentional agent and suffering patient) is ‘a core
feature of all immoral acts’ (p. 107). Consequently, there
are no harmless moral transgressions in folk moral cognition,
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simply because the dyadic template compels ‘the mind to
perceive victims even when they are objectively absent’
(Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014, p. 1).
On the other hand, Sousa and colleagues have argued for a
deflationary view of the morality of harm, in which harmful
transgressions are seen as moral transgressions only if they
are seen as involving injustice, that is, harmful transgressions
are reducible to fairness transgressions (see Sousa, 2009;
Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009; Piazza, Sousa, &
Holbrook, 2013; Sousa & Piazza, 2014). In other words,
not all harmful actions are moral transgressions (e.g., a dentist
is causing you pain in order to fix your teeth), only those
harmful actions that are unjustified (that is, involve unjust
or unfair treatment) are categorized as moral transgressions
(e.g., a dentist is causing you pain to obtain your golden
tooth). Moreover, questioning Haidt’s position, Sousa and
colleagues have argued that more evidence is needed to show
that other normative domains are moralized in terms of the
moral signature and, therefore, whether there are other moral
domains in this specific sense remains an open empirical
questions. Finally, also questioning Haidt’s position,
Baumard and colleagues have argued more radically that
many of Haidt’s domains are not clearly seen as dissociated
from the domain of fairness, which opens the possibility that
these domains are moralized only insofar as they involve
fairness considerations (Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013;
Baumard & Sperber, 2012; Sperber & Baumard, 2012; see
also Fraser, 2012). Thus, taken together, Sousa, Baumard
and their colleagues suggest an alternative fairness-based
monistic view. According to both monistic positions, then,
it could be suggested that even if Mongolians express a
concern about a variety of transgressions (à la Haidt), it is
quite possible that these different transgression are moralized
only insofar as they involve fairness (Sousa and Baumard) or
harm (Gray and colleagues) considerations.
Before proceeding to the study about the scope of moral
considerations among Mongolian participants, we will
briefly delineate a conceptual framework that will be
employed in this paper. Our discussion concerns normative
judgments – that is, judgments to the effect that an action is
forbidden and that pursuing the action is wrong (or,
equivalently, is a transgression). It should be noted that in
the current literature, while delineating the moral domain,
the term ‘moral’ has been used in two basic senses (see Sousa
& Piazza, 2014). In one sense, the emphasis is on a type of
normative content. Indeed, the above discussed positions talk
about the ‘moral’ in this sense. In another sense, the emphasis
is on a specific type of normative conviction – that is, moral
transgressions evoke a strong evaluative conviction that an
action is wrong, no matter what is the normative content.
Importantly, there is little agreement on what counts as a
relevant normative content (e.g., are there five normative
domains or just one?), and how to characterize the strong
normative conviction in moral judgments. Thus, for the
purposes of our current research, we will specify the nor-
mative content as moral domain with normative conviction.
Specifically, following the tradition of Turiel (e.g., Turiel,
1983), we characterize the normative conviction specifying
moral transgressions in contraposition to the normative
conviction specifying conventional transgressions (like eating
with one’s fingers), in terms of two dimensions: while moral
transgressions are seen as authority independent (i.e., their
wrongness is not cancellable by the decision of any authority)
and general in scope (i.e., their wrongness extends to different
places and times), conventional transgressions are seen as
authority dependent and/or local in scope (for alternative
ways of characterizing the strong normative conviction that
specifies moral transgressions, see Goodwin & Darley,
2008; Sripada & Stich, 2006; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis,
2005; Tetlock, 2003). We shall call the criteria of authority
independence and generality the ‘moral signature’ (see Kelly,
Stich, Haley, Eng, & Fessler, 2007; Sousa et al., 2009).
From this perspective, the claim that there are different
moral domains is tantamount to the claim that ordinary people
can have the above strong normative conviction (i.e., ‘moral
signature’) in relation to different types of normative contents
(e.g., unjustified harm, unfair treatment in cooperation, and
expression of disloyalty to a group, disrespect towards
authority, or purity transgressions). In other words, each
separate type of normative content that evokes the moral
signature is to be considered a distinct moral domain.
Conversely, from this perspective, there are two ways of
showing that a normative domain is not a distinct moral
domain. One may show that the normative domain does not
evoke the moral signature, and hence is not a moral domain
at all. Alternatively, one may show that although the
normative domain apparently evokes the moral signature, it
is another type of normative content that is doing the job,
and hence that the supposed normative domain is not a
distinct moral domain (see Turiel’s classical argument against
Shweder; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; see also Fraser,
2012). For example, one may show that purity transgressions
evoke the moral signature only when they are public
transgressions, and that the normative content that makes
these transgressions evoke the moral signature is related to
the fact that they are offensive, and therefore harmful. In other
words, one may argue that purity transgressions qua moral
transgressions are reducible to harmful transgressions (see
Royzman, Leeman, & Baron, 2009).
Theoretical predictions
Our research design is a revised version of the moral-
conventional task that was employed by Turiel and his
colleagues (Nucci, 2001; Smetana, 1993; Tisak, 1995; Turiel,
1983). Specifically, the current version was devised to probe
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the claims concerning the existence of different moral
domains put forward by the aforementioned theoretical
positions in the Mongolian context. According to current
design, each separate type of normative content that evokes
the moral signature is to be considered a distinct moral
domain. However, we also took into consideration the
monistic possibility, for example, when fairness-based
normative content is somehow implied in other normative
domains thereby evoking the moral signature. Taken
together, we put forward three kinds of predictions that stem
from different theoretical positions, and test them in the
Mongolian context.
First, if Mongolian participants evoke the moral signature
in all five domains, this is evidence in favour of Haidt’s theory
of moral foundations, since theory predicts that non-WEIRD
cultures are concerned with five types of moral transgressions.
Second, if participants evoke the moral signature in the
conventional domain, this is evidence against the moral/
conventional distinction as traditionally conceived by Turiel
and colleagues. Third, if participants imply some kind of
fairness considerations in the harm domain, this is evidence
consistent with the deflationary view of harm (as Sousa and
colleagues argue). If fairness is consistently implied in all
domains that are moralized, this is evidence consistent with
the strong claim that normative domains are moralized only
insofar as they involve fairness considerations (as Baumard
and colleagues argue). Conversely, if participants imply some
kind of harm in other domains, this is evidence consistent with
harm-based monism (as Gray and colleagues argue).
Methods
Cultural context
The study was conducted in Ulan Bator, the capital city of
Mongolia. The country is situated between China and the
Siberian parts of Russia. For the most part, Mongolians were
nomadic herders, pasturing horses, sheep, yaks, and other
animals in the steppes. Historically, shamanism was the
dominant form of religion, but since the end of the 16th
century the majority of Mongolians converted to the Tibetan
style of Buddhism. In the 20th century, Mongolia was one of
the first Soviet countries to undergo rapid social changes and
urbanization. Now, an independent democratic republic,
Mongolia has a fast growing economic centre in Ulan Bator
(with over a million inhabitants, and with a population of
2.9 million in the country as a whole), while a significant
proportion of the population outside of bigger towns still
practice a nomadic life style in steppes. According to the last
National Census in 2010, approximately 53% of the
population are Buddhists, 3% Shamanists, 3% Muslims
(mostly among the Kazakh minority), and 39% non-
religious.
Participants
Because a proper lab environment and recruitment system
were not possible, we relied on convenience sampling. Two
Mongolian assistants helped to recruit 340 participants at
the National University of Mongolia, University of Science
and Technology, and University of Humanities. Participants
were not paid and were asked to complete voluntarily a study
questionnaire in the auditoriums between the lectures.
Participants who agreed to participate but did not answer
the primary study questions were excluded from the study.
This way, 74 participants were excluded, leaving a total of
266 participants (65% female; mean age 19). Religious
affiliation was distributed as follows: Buddhists (44%),
Shamanists (12%), both Buddhist and Shamanists (7%),
non-religious (34%), other (4%).
Materials and procedure
There were six conditions in the study, each with two
separate vignettes describing what an agent did in a specific
situation. Our main aim was to test recent theoretical claims
about the scope of moral domains. Thus, five conditions each
involved actions corresponding to one of the five Haidtian
moral domains, and one condition involved actions
corresponding to the conventional domain, as conceived by
Turiel (see Appendix for the conditions with their two
respective vignettes).2 The first author of this paper spent
one year inMongolia doing field research, using his familiarity
with the culture to validate the content of each vignette. In
addition, Mongolian assistants read and commented on the
comprehensibility and cultural relevance of the stories and
questions. The stories conveyed rather typical characters with
typical Mongolian names in recognizable settings.3
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the six
conditions of the study, reading its two separate vignettes
and answering their related questions (the order of
presentation of the two vignettes was counterbalanced). The
questions for each vignette were as follows, in fixed order.
First, the participants were asked whether they consider the
action of the scenario a transgression: ‘in your personal
opinion, is it wrong that [agent] did [action] in this situation?’
(‘Yes/No’). If the answer was positive (‘Yes’), the participant
was presented with the two moral signature probes (i.e.,
authority dependence and generalizability): (1) ‘suppose that
an authority that you trust and respect said that in this
situation it is not wrong for agent A to doX’; (2) ‘suppose that
agent A lived in a country where everyone thinks that in this
situation it is not wrong to do X’. For each moral signature
probe, participants had to indicate whether they agreed that
the action X would still be wrong under such circumstances
(an indication of agreement in both probes constituted the
‘moral signature’). After the moral signature probes,
participants answered two explicit questions about whether
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the action caused harm to someone (‘hurt someone physically
or psychologically’) or was unfair to someone. Now, if the
answer to the initial transgression question was negative
(‘No’), the participant was asked to skip the moral probes
and move directly to the other two questions. In relation to
these two questions, participants were also asked to indicate
who was subjected to harm or injustice. In relation to the
remaining questions, participants were also requested to
provide a brief justification for their answers. For these open
questions, participants wrote down their responses.
Results
TableT1 1 represents the number of participants evincing the
response patterns in each of the scenarios. Columns ‘NO’
and ‘YES’ represent the number of participants who answered
‘no’ (i.e., not wrong) or ‘yes’ (i.e., wrong) to the transgression
question. The remaining columns represent the number of
participants evincing each of the four possible response
patterns of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to the moral signature probes
(the first ‘YES’ or ‘NO’ is related to the authority dependence
probe; the second ‘YES’ or ‘NO’ is related to the
generalizability probe), with the ‘YES-YES’ column showing
the participants who evoked the moral signature. A large
amount of participants answered ‘not-wrong’ in some
scenarios – in particular, Authority (Dalai Lama) and In-group
(Citizenship). Of the remaining participants, who answered
‘wrong’, a rather high percentage evinced the moral signature
in most scenarios.
TableT2 2 shows one-sample Chi-Square tests against chance
on the percentage of participants answering wrong (‘Yes’) to
the transgression probe and on the percentage of participants
evoking the moral signature (i.e., the ‘Yes-Yes’ response
pattern). The results indicate that, except for Authority
(Dalai) and In-group (Citizenship), wrongness answers were
significantly above chance in all scenarios. Moreover, moral
signature answers were significantly above chance in all
scenarios, except for the conventional ones, where they
approached significance. Effect sizes varied from medium
to large.
It has been shown in previous research that religiosity has a
strong influence on people’s understanding of moral issues
(e.g., Graham et al., 2013). In respect to moral signature
responses, we compared all religious participants (66%) with
non-religious participants (34%), across all domains. Each
participant had twomoral signature responses, thus there were
three possible patterns of the overall moral signature
responses: 0, no signature response; 1, one signature response;
2, two signature responses. Two samples Chi-Square test
showed that, overall, there was no significant difference
between religious and non-religious participants, x2(2, 250)
=0.592, p=0.744. The only potentially moderating role of
religiosity was in responses to the Authority (Dalai)
transgression question (more in the Discussion section).
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that moral signature answers
were significantly above chance in all scenarios, except for
the conventional ones. However, the latter scenarios
approached significance. For that, we compared moral
signature responses between all five moral domains and the
conventional domain. As in the previous analyses, two moral
signature values were combined. Interestingly, two sample
Chi-Square tests showed that there was a statistically
significant difference between the harm and fairness
domains, and the conventional domain (x2(2, 81)=13.447,
p=0.001 and x2(2, 90)=6.711, p=0.035, respectively). But
there was no significant difference between the authority,
in-group and purity domains, and the conventional domain
Table 1 Number of participants for each response pattern
Scenarios Total Transgression
Probe
Moral Signature Probes
NO YES YES-YES YES-NO NO-YES NO-NO
Harm (Hitting) 43 2 41 34 7 0 0
Harm (Insulting) 3 40 35 5 0 0
Fairness (Cheating) 51 0 51 40 10 0 1
Fairness (Stealing) 3 48 35 12 0 1
Authority (Flag) 42 2 40 34 6 0 0
Authority (Dalai) 20 22 17 1 0 4
Ingroup (Citizen) 42 21 21 15 5 0 1
Ingroup (Betrayal) 9 33 24 6 0 3
Purity (Dog) 47 10 37 25 9 2 1
Purity (Temple) 12 35 29 5 0 1
Convention (Hands) 41 14 27 18 9 0 0
Convention (“You”) 6 35 23 12 0 0
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
(x2(2, 79) =2.117, p=0.347; x2(2, 75) =3.083, p=0.214;
x2(2, 84) =2.106, p=0.349; respectively).
TableT3 3 concerns only those participants who evoked the
moral signature. It shows the number of participants in each
scenario evincing each of the four possible response patterns
to follow-up questions about the presence of harm (H) and/or
unfairness (F).4 In the domains of harm and fairness, almost
all participants indicated the presence of harm and fairness
considerations (i.e., +H+F), and almost no participant
indicated their joint absence (i.e., -H-F). According to one
proposal (see Sousa & Piazza, 2014), there is a good
theoretical reason to reduce harm domain to fairness domain,
that is, harmful actions can be conceptualized as moral
transgression only when fairness considerations are involved.
Our results do not provide a direct evidence for this
contention since an equally large proportion of participants
indicated that harm and/or unfairness was present (+H+F
). One thing is clear: these are very closely related concepts,
further empirical research is needed to disentangle their
relationship.
In the remaining scenarios, responses were much more
varied, departing from this clear-cut pattern to a greater or
lesser extent. It is worth noticing that, in most of these
remaining scenarios, a large proportion of participants still
indicated that harm and/or fairness was present (i.e.,
evinced+H+F, +H-F, or -H+F). Now, to what extent these
concepts, jointly or separately, underlie other domains is still
an open question. However, taken together and across
scenarios, the correlation between fairness and the moral
signature responses was weak but significant, whereas the
correlation between harm and the moral signature was even
weaker and not significant – rϕ (412)=0.15, p=0.003 and
rϕ (412)=0.08, p=0.107, respectively. The correlation
between harm and fairness was strong and significant – rϕ
(412)=0.65, p=0.000. A binary logistic regression using
fairness and harm as predictors and the moral signature as
the outcome variable revealed a main effect of fairness
(B= -1.03, Wald=6.55, p= .010), but neither a main effect
of harm nor an interaction (B= -.18, Wald= .14, p= .704
and B= .58, Wald= .78, p= .376, respectively).5
Discussion and conclusions
Before discussing how the results speak to the theoretical
predictions we delineated, it is worth addressing the fact that,
in relation to the Authority (Dalai Lama) and In-group
Table 2 One sample Chi-Square tests against the chance
Scenarios Wrong Moral Signature
Significance (p) Effect size (rϕ) Significance (p) Effect size (rϕ)
Harm (Hitting) .000 .907 .000 .659
Harm (Insulting) .000 .861 .000 .750
Fairness (Cheating)* - - .000 .569
Fairness (Stealing) .000 .882 .001 .458
Authority (Flag) .000 .905 .000 .700
Authority (Dalai) .758 .048 .011 .545
Ingroup (Citizenship) 1 0 .050 .429
Ingroup (Betrayal) .000 .571 .009 .454
Purity (Dog) .000 .575 .033 .351
Purity (Temple) .001 .489 .000 .657
Conventional (Hands) .042 .317 .083 .333
Conventional (“You”) .000 .707 .063 .314
Note. * All participants (100%) responded that cheating is wrong.
Table 3 Number of participants showing each of the four
possible response patterns to harm and fairness
questions
Scenarios Total +H+F +H-F -H+F -H-F
Harm (Hitting) 34 34 0 0 0
Harm (Insulting) 35 33 1 0 1
Fairness (Cheating) 39 38 0 0 1
Fairness (Stealing) 35 31 1 1 2
Authority (Flag) 30 9 3 4 14
Authority (Dalai) 17 9 0 0 8
Ingroup (Citizenship) 13 4 3 0 6
Ingroup (Betrayal) 22 16 0 5 1
Purity (Dog) 23 12 2 6 3
Purity (Temple) 28 18 4 3 3
Conventional (Hands) 17 2 2 0 13
Conventional (“You”) 23 13 2 2 6
Note. +H+F (both harm and fairness present), +H-F (only harm
present), -H+F (only fairness present), -H-F (neither harm nor
fairness present).
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(Citizenship) scenarios, approximately half of the participants
answered ‘not wrong’. One possible explanation for the
Authority (Dalai Lama) scenario is that non-religious
participants (34%), in contrast to religious participants, took
Dalai Lama as a less important authority figure and therefore
answered that there is nothing wrong with practising shooting
at his portrait because, as many responded, ‘it is just a portrait’.
Indeed, while 61% of non-religious participants thought it was
not wrong to use his portrait for shooting, 68% of all religious
participants (of which 71% were Buddhists) thought it was
wrong because, as many responded, ‘he should respect [Dalai
Lama]’. As for the In-group (Citizenship) scenario, one
possible explanation could be that our sample consists mainly
of young students. Interestingly, even though in Mongolia
Chinese are very often portrayed in negative terms, and
marriage to a Chinese man is sometimes considered as a kind
of treason, many students explained it as a ‘personal matter’.
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of participants
who did consider those actions to be wrong, consistently
evoked the moral signature – 17 out of 22 in the Authority
(Dalai Lama) and 15 out of 21 in the In-group (Citizenship)
scenarios, respectively.
Moreover, although we did not provide an analysis of
participants’ justifications to their ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answers,
we would like to point out a problem clearly indicated by
these justifications in relation to the generalizability probe
in the context of the Authority (Flag) scenario. Contrary to
our intention, some participants may have interpreted the
generalizability probe in this context as if the target agent
was still a Mongolian using the Mongolian flag to clean the
toilet, but in another country. Thus, the high percentage of
participants evoking the moral signature in this scenario has
to be interpreted with caution.
Having said that, the results show that in all five Haidtian
domains a significant amount of participants who responded
‘yes’ to the transgression probe evoked the moral signature,
suggesting that Mongolians are inclined to moralize all these
domains, which would constitute evidence in favour of moral
pluralism. Something Haidt predicted would be the case with
non-WEIRD cultures.
Reductionists may counter-argue, however. First, there is
the issue of whether the harm domain can be reduced to the
domain of fairness, as far as morality is concerned. Our
results from follow-up questions showed a strong correlation
between concerns with harm and fairness. However, con-
cerns of fairness not only correlated with the moral signature
but also were an independent predictor of it, while concerns of
harm neither predicted nor mediated the moral signature
response pattern. This is some, but not conclusive, evidence
in favour of the deflationary view of harm advocated by Sousa
and colleagues, and against not only Turiel, Haidt and their
colleagues, who distinguish the domains of harm and fairness,
but also against monists like Gray and colleagues, who would
like to reduce all morality to a fundamental concern with
harm. However, more direct evidence is needed to rule out
the possibility of harm-based reduction or the possibility that
indeed these are two separate domains.
Second, there is the issue of whether the domains of In-
group, Authority and Purity are reducible to the domain of
fairness, namely, whether a concern with fairness is what leads
participants to evoke the moral signature in these domains.
Onemay argue that a large amount of participants did not have
a concern with fairness while evoking the moral signature,
which is evidence for pluralism and against the kind ofmonism
advocated by Baumard. However, a concern with fairness was
still substantial in these domains. In Purity (temple) 21 out of
28 participants, in Purity (dog) 18 out of 23 participants, in
In-group (Betrayal) 21 out of 22 participants expressed a
concern with fairness (see Table 3). In the remaining scenarios,
only about half of the participants expressed such a concern,
but these scenarios are somewhat more problematic. Still, even
though some scenarios (notably, both Authority and In-group
(Citizenship) scenario) did not elicit fairness considerations to
a significant number of participants, this does not rule out the
possibility that an implicitly held concept of fairness facilitates
various moral judgments. Thus, the take-home message is that
Haidt was right to point out that non-WEIRD cultures are
concerned with a wider array of moral transgressions (as our
Mongolian sample shows), but perhaps is not completely right
about the psychological processes that deliver it. The
psychology of fairness, as Sousa and Baumard argue, could
be, to some significant degree, at the heart of this process.
Further work, with new methodology and with varied sample,
should shed some light on particular details of these
psychological processes.
Finally, we also wanted to test whether Mongolians
conceptualize certain transgressions as conventional à la
Turiel. Our results indicate that participants evoked the moral
signature in the conventional domain much less frequently,
showing that in a way Turiel is correct. However, the number
of participants who evoked the moral signature was still
relatively high in both Conventional (hands) and Conventional
(‘you’). It seems that a non-negligible number of Mongolian
participants think that the actions of eating noodles with bare
hands and addressing professors with informal ‘you’ are moral
transgressions. What kind of normative content could lead to
such a response? Is it just a concern with etiquette? In relation
to Conventional (‘you’), because 17 out 23 participants
expressed a concern with fairness and/or harm (see Table 3),
it is possible that most participants consider this type of action
to be unjustifiably offensive, which, assuming the deflationary
view of themorality of harm, would be consistent with fairness
monism (see also Turiel’s (1983) discussion of the second-
order moral significance that conventional transgressions
may acquire). However, some participants in Conventional
(‘you’) and most participants in Conventional (hands) did
not express any concern with fairness or harm. This may be
explained in terms of disrespect of authority (i.e., addressing
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professors with informal ‘you’ compromises an important
hierarchical relationship) and purity (i.e., eating noodles with
bare hands is indecent and disgusting). In other words, what
is a convention to Westerners (Turiel’s typical sample), might
not be a convention to Mongolians, so it can evoke a much
stronger normative reaction, that is, the moral signature (see
Shweder et al., 1997, for similar observation among Orissa
in India).
Endnotes
1. For instance, studies with children from orthodox Jewish and
Amish communities by Nucci and Turiel (1993), with Brazilian
adults by Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993), Indian adults by
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (1997), or Hong Kong
Chinese participants by Yau and Smetana (2003).
2. For the original material in Mongolian, contact the first author.
3. As for the prototypicallity of transgressions in each domain, for
the sake of the argument, we characterized each domain by using
Haidt’s and his colleagues descriptions of what content makes
each domain (see, for instance, Graham et al., 2011). Of course,
we acknowledge a need for separate qualitative research that
would help to determine people’s own prototypical examples of
moral transgression.
4. Total numbers do not correspond exactly to related total numbers
in Table 1 because of some missing values.
5. The results here should be interpreted with caution, since the
assumption of independence is not completely met, given that
we consider the paired scenarios of each domain as two separate
cases, when in fact they are not.
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APPENDIX
Harm (Hitting)
Harm (Insulting)
Fairness(Cheating)
Fairness (Stealing)
Authority (Flag)
Authority (Dalai)
In-group (Citizenship)
In-group (Betrayal)
Purity (Dog)
Purity (Temple)
Conventional (Hands)
Conventional (‘You’)
Munkh-Erdene is sitting on a bench and is very bored. One unfamiliar boy passes by and
Munkh-Erdene punches him on his face very hard, just for fun.
A new girl moved to a local town. Otgonbayar didn’t like her dress, so he insulted the girl by
calling her ugly.
Nergui borrowed a big sum of money from his good friend to buy a car. He bought the car and
never paid back his friend.
While driving in the steppes, Gantulga noticed a sheep that was a bit apart from a nearby herd.
The herders were in the ger, so he grabbed that sheep and drove away.
Byamba is cleaning out her closet, and finds her oldMongolian flag. She doesn’t want the flag
anymore, so she cuts it up into pieces and uses the rags to clean the toilet.
Ganzorig is a skilled archer. One day he decides to practise on a painted target. He goes to a
remote place in the steppes but, when he is about to start practising, he finds out that he left his
target at home. However, in his bag Ganzorig also has a picture of the Dalai Lama. The picture
seems to be the right size to serve as a target, so he practises by shooting at the Dalai Lama
picture.
Altantsetseg went to China to study. Over several years she learned the language, married to a
Chinese man and renounced Mongolian citizenship.
Batbayar and other men from his tribe went to sell some horses near the border with Russia.
Suddenly, several Russian armedmen from that region appeared. Even though Batbayar had a
gun as well, he was scared and ran way, leaving his fellow tribesmen to fight alone.
Erdene’s dog was killed by a car in front of his house. He had heard that dogmeat is delicious,
so he cut up the dog’s body, cooked it and ate it while he was alone.
Ganbold was walking in a small town. He had a terrible stomachache all day and he needed to
relieve himself immediately. Then he saw a small Buddhist temple. Nobody was around, so
he rushed inside the temple and relieved himself there.
It is lunch time at high school. Enkhjargal bought some tsuivan at the local canteen and ate it
with her hands.
Bolormaa is studying at university. When she meets her new professor, she addresses him
with informal ’you’
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